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ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES TO




The moral personality of the corporation, like that of other organizations,
has long posed a number of theoretical and practical challenges.  Many of the
legal questions raised by organizations are complex but resolvable by careful
technical analysis.  Such questions—for example, how to incorporate a business
or a nonprofit endeavor, what are the perils of the general partnership, what
are the consequences of acquisition via merger—are answerable within the am-
bit of legal rules specific to organizations.  In contrast, it is often difficult to ex-
plain how duties and rights, created outside the sphere of organizational law it-
self, might intelligibly be applied to a person1 that is purely the invented
creature of compliance with legal form.  Many crimes, for example, require a
particular mental state, which presupposes a sentient actor.  Such challenges
aside, organizations frustrate the strategies of law enforcement in ways that
natural persons do not.  As H.L.A. Hart observed in 1954, “it is not the legal
personality but the ‘moral’ personality of organised groups that perplexes most:
these exist apart from legal rules . . . .”2
In this essay I explore the fit between agency doctrine and the propensity of
organizations to obey or disregard the law.  Organizational culture and prac-
tice, I argue, often reflect how the organization as a principal has shaped its
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1. The term “person” applies to corporations as defined by statute.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 1.40(9), (16) (1984).
2. H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37, 55 (1954), reprinted
in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21, 42-43 (1983) [hereinafter HART
ESSAYS].  Hart’s essay is a critique of developing legal theory “on the back of definition.”  Id. at 41,
reprinted in HART ESSAYS, supra, at 25.  Many of Hart’s specific examples demonstrate that asking the
question “What is a corporation?” is not a helpful starting point for fitting corporations into the gen-
eral legal structure.  Instead, Hart argued that legal consequences are best ascribed to corporations
through a process of reasoning by analogy.  See infra note 50.  For a useful elaboration of the implica-
tions of Hart’s essay, see Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993).
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agents’ incentives and preferences.  Much of the essay examines two dimen-
sions of the moral personality of the organization: its vicarious liability for
criminal acts committed by its employees and other agents, along with the in-
centives that vicarious liability creates; and the extent to which the organiza-
tion’s governing body bears responsibility to exercise control over employees
and other agents that is sufficient to deter and detect wrongful conduct.  My
specific examples concern business corporations, but the issues are endemic to
the conduct of activity by organizations in general.  Moreover, questions sur-
rounding vicarious liability are interrelated with questions about the proper
role of a governing body.  In the corporate context, how to define “the corpora-
tion” and specify its boundaries is a common element.  For example, when do
shareholders have responsibility to exercise control?  Does “the corporation”
for this purpose encompass the relationship between parent corporations and
their subsidiaries?  In contrast, separate questions of definition look inward to
the corporation’s internal governance structure.  Vicarious liability treats the
corporation as a principal with a duty to control its employees and other agents.
The line between vicarious and direct liability is increasingly blurry.  The prin-
cipal’s duty to exercise control has been expanded by tort law doctrines such as
nondelegable duty, with the effect that the principal’s duties of control are not
lessened when the individual actor is not an employee.
The concrete focal point for much of this essay is the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s 1996 opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litiga-
tion.3  Events underlying the case call into question the proper role of directors
within the internal structures through which a corporation exercises control,
and the circumstances under which directors should be accountable to share-
holders when they have been remiss in this respect.4  In Caremark, the court
stated that corporate directors have an affirmative duty to monitor other or-
ganizational actors who are situated deeper within the organization.5  I consider
at some length the specific implications and limits of this duty, beginning, how-
ever, with a somewhat broader perspective grounded in the law of agency as it
applies to corporations.  I argue that the corporation, like any principal in an
agency relationship, defines the incentive structure within which its agents act.
While its control over individual actors is never perfect, the corporation estab-
lishes organizational rewards and sanctions for activity that shape how its
agents interpret and otherwise respond to the instructions they are given.  Al-
though the principal’s ability to define its agents’ incentives is a significant justi-
fication for imposing vicarious liability on principals for their agents’ wrongful
acts, and for expanded doctrines like nondelegable duty, the leading critique of
vicarious liability does not reflect the import of the principal’s ability to shape
its agents’ conduct.6  I do not articulate any general rule as to when vicarious
                                                          
3. 698 A.2d 959.
4. See id. at 961-66.
5. See id. at 971 (stating the test of liability as “lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or
systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight . . .”).
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liability is justifiable, nor do I propose any expansion in vicarious liability be-
yond that reflected in well-settled case law.7
Caremark provides a concrete instance to consider the interplay between
duties and remedies that are conventionally treated as matters of internal cor-
porate governance, and duties and liabilities imposed on the corporation as a
principal in an agency relationship.  I argue that the content of directors’ duty
to monitor should reflect the incentives the corporation has created for its em-
ployees and agents.  However difficult it may be to formulate a satisfactory rule
of liability for directors’ failure to monitor, directors are ultimately accountable
for the corporation’s culture.  Under present law, though, the effectiveness of
that accountability may be undercut by roadblocks to shareholder derivative
litigation, which apply even when the corporation’s senior management has
been complicit in wrongdoing that led to massive losses for the corporation.
Thus, I propose an adjustment to the business judgment rule, with the objective
of achieving a better fit between the rule and the substantive point of imposing
a duty to monitor on directors.  In particular, I argue that it is inappropriate to
apply a presumption of good faith to directors when the corporation’s senior
management has been implicated in criminal wrongdoing.
II
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A.  Events Underlying Caremark
The basic factual scenario involved in Caremark is a useful starting point.8
The corporation provided health care services, deriving a major portion of its
revenues from Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurers.9  As a recipient
of payments from Medicare and Medicaid, Caremark was subject to an exten-
sive set of complex federal statutes and regulations, including the statute collo-
quially known as the Anti-Referral Payments Law (“ARPL”).10  ARPL makes
it a federal felony to
knowingly and willfully offer[ ] or pay[ ] any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any
person to induce such person
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the fur-
nishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in
                                                          
6. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
7. See, e.g., New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)
(corporation vicariously liable for crimes committed by employees and other agents when acting
within scope of employment or agency); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 31-32 (1st
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom AZL Resources, Inc. v. Margaret Hall Found., Inc., 481 U.S. 1072
(1987) (stating that a principal can be vicariously liable for tortious misrepresentations of agents, on
basis that agent had actual or apparent authority to make representation, or on basis of agent’s status).
8. 698 A.2d at 961-69.
9. See id. at 961.
10. See id. at 961-62.
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part under subchapter XVIII [Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled] of this
chapter or a State health care program . . . .11
The specified penalty upon conviction is a fine not to exceed $25,000 or im-
prisonment for not more than five years.12  Following a multi-year investigation,
Caremark and two of its officers were among a group of defendants indicted for
violations of ARPL.13  Caremark settled with the federal government by
pleading guilty to one count of mail fraud, presumably attributable to conduct
that occurred incident to acts alleged to violate ARPL, and by paying a com-
bined amount of $164.4 million, inclusive of criminal fines and payments to re-
solve civil claims.14  The settlement agreement stipulated that no senior execu-
tive of Caremark “participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of
wrongdoing . . . .”15  Subsequently Caremark paid an additional $98.5 million to
settle disputes with private payors aggrieved by the business practices that led
to the ARPL problems.16
What is relevant for our immediate purpose is that ARPL clearly defines a
crime that requires specific intent, that is, the statute requires that the defen-
dant have acted “knowingly and willfully.”17  Moreover, conduct violates the
federal mail fraud statute only if it is knowing and only if the defendant will-
fully participates in the scheme.18  In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth
                                                          
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (1994).  The quoted text is as written at the time of Caremark’s of-
fenses; amendments that would not change the outcome of the case have since been made.  See 42
U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
12. See id. § 1320a-7b(a).
13. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963-64.  Also indicted were a physician who allegedly received $1.1
million to induce him to distribute a human growth hormone drug marketed by Caremark, as well as a
physician who allegedly received $134,600 for patient referrals.  See id. at 964.  Not surprisingly, ARPL
prohibits soliciting or receiving payments in contravention of the statute, in addition to its prohibition
of offering or making payments.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
14. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 965 n.10.
15. Id. at 965 (emphasis omitted).  It may be that as a consequence of this stipulation, coverage
became available under a policy of director and officer (“D&O”) liability insurance when coverage
would otherwise have been excluded.  The stipulation would be helpful in enabling Caremark to in-
demnify its senior executives’ litigation expenses because it is consistent with a conclusion that the
senior executives did not fail to act in good faith.  See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(a) (Supp. 1996);
see also infra note 96.  Indeed the Delaware statute mandates indemnification when the actor has been
successful “on the merits or otherwise” in defending against the action or proceeding. DEL. CODE
ANN., tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991).  Although the language they use is nonuniform, D&O policies typically
insure the corporation against its liability arising from indemnification as well as providing direct cov-
erage to directors and officers as insured persons.  See JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 8.04 (1981 & 1997
Supp.).  The D&O carrier itself is not a party to settlement negotiations like those in Caremark, of
course, although the outcome of negotiations may determine the carrier’s liability under the D&O
policy.  Scholars recognize the impact of insurance coverage on litigants’ strategic incentives in other
contexts.  See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Fund-
ing, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721 (1997); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability
Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 356-59, 363-64 (1990).  I am indebted to Kent Syverud for bring-
ing this point to my attention.
16. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 966.
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
18. A defendant has violated the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), if the defendant
“devised or intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
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Circuit interpreted ARPL’s language to require the defendant to know that
conduct is prohibited by the statute and to have specific intent to disobey the
law.19  Based on its interpretation of ARPL, the Ninth Circuit held that individ-
ual investors in a partnership, who did not authorize or approve representa-
tions contrary to ARPL by the partnership’s agent, did not themselves violate
ARPL.20  Caremark’s settlement, in contrast, appears to be premised on corpo-
rate vicarious liability, and in a relatively pristine form at that, given the stipu-
lated absence of wrongdoing engaged in or authorized by the corporation’s
senior management or directors.  The settlement also presupposes that an indi-
vidual actor’s specific intent and knowledge may be imputed to the corporation
even when the actor is not in a position of central executive authority.21  In-
stead, the dispositive question is whether employees or other agents of Care-
mark violated the mail fraud statute or APRL while acting within the scope of
their actual or apparent authority on behalf of the corporation (such as by
making agreements with physicians).
B.  Organizational Incentives and Vicarious Liability
As it happens, federal criminal law has long embraced vicarious corporate
liability for criminal misconduct, even when the offense requires a showing of
specific intent, so long as the crime is not one a corporation is incapable of
committing and the individual actor’s conduct occurred within the scope of the
employment or agency.22  The measurement of “scope” encompasses the
                                                          
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . .”  This language implies a
scienter requirement.
19. 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
20. See id. at 1400-01.
21. If the agent has power to bind the principal concerning a matter or has a duty to provide in-
formation to the principal, knowledge that the agent obtains imputes to the principal.  RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958).  If the agent obtained the knowledge while acting adversely to
the principal, the agent’s knowledge does not impute to the principal.  See id. § 282(1).  Nonetheless,
the agent’s knowledge does impute to the principal when the agent appeared to a third party to be
acting for the principal’s benefit, see, e.g., In re Lloyd Securities, Inc., 153 B.R. 677, 683 (E.D. Pa.
1993), or when the principal knowingly benefited from the agent’s fraud, see In re Maxwell Newspa-
pers, Inc., 164 B.R. 858 (Bkr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282
(2)(b) & cmt. f (1958) (regarding agent’s appearance of acting for principal’s benefit); id. § 282(2)(c) &
cmt. h (regarding principal knowingly benefiting from agent’s fraud).
22. See New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-95 (1909).  The
Court did not give examples of “crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by corporations.”
Id. at 494.  The number of such crimes is likely to be small, given the corporation’s liability for criminal
acts committed by its human agents who act within the scope of their actual or apparent authority.
Even some sexual crimes may be committed by corporations.  See, e.g., State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity,
696 A.2d 530, 537 (N.H. 1997) (corporation vicariously liable for prostitution).  Bigamy might be an
example of a crime that cannot be committed by a person other than a human actor him or herself, but
perhaps that example is plausible only because it is difficult to imagine a board of directors or high
managerial agent directing or authorizing an agent’s bigamous marriage in connection with the agent’s
services to the corporation.  But see JOHN SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 188 (8th ed. 1996)
(leading English commentators observe that it is “quite inconceivable” that a corporate officer would
“commit within the scope of his employment . . . bigamy, rape, incest and, possibly, perjury”).  Smith
and Hogan concede that often, though, a corporation may be secondarily liable even in otherwise in-
conceivable instances of criminal misconduct.  See id. at 188 n.5 (managing director of “an incorpo-
rated Marriage Advisory Bureau negotiates a marriage which he knows to be bigamous”).
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agent’s apparent as well as actual authority.23  Whether the corporation bene-
fited from the agent’s conduct is, at most, treated as an evidential fact, not an
operative requirement for vicarious liability; it suffices that the agent’s motive
is only in part to benefit the corporation, a standard consistent with the coinci-
dent presence of self-interested motives.24  That the corporation prohibited the
conduct is not a defense, although the fact that the agent contravened a specific
prohibition may help establish that the agent lacked any motive to benefit the
corporation.25  Federal criminal law is thus in marked contrast with the Model
Penal Code, which requires complicity at high levels within the corporation.26
The principle of vicarious liability within federal criminal law also contrasts
with the complicity requirement—comparable to the Model Penal Code—
imposed by federal common law for vicarious liability for punitive damages in
civil litigation.27  High-level complicity is relevant, however, at the penalty
phase in federal prosecutions, a point discussed below.
Given its stringency, it is not surprising that the federal doctrine of vicarious
liability has attracted criticism.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have had
the effect of enhancing the fines paid by corporate violators compared with
                                                          
23. This principle is applicable as well to noncriminal misconduct.  See, e.g., American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 568-74 (1982) (agent of professional so-
ciety acting with apparent authority binds society even though agent did not act with intention of bene-
fiting society; society liable in private action for treble damages due to agent’s violation of antitrust
laws).
24. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (fact that em-
ployee violated instructions is not a defense to corporation’s liability for criminal violation of antitrust
laws, nor is employee’s motive; employee testified he violated instructions and participated in illegal
boycott due to “anger and personal pique”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
228(1)(c) (1958) (defining scope of employment of servants).  At least for purposes of vicarious civil
liability, the principal is liable for the misrepresentations of an agent acting with apparent authority,
even when the agent acted solely for the agent’s own purpose, unless the third party has notice of the
agent’s self-interested purpose.  See id. § 262.  For an example of a recent application of this doctrine,
see Grease Monkey Int’l Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1995).  Vicarious liability for fraud is ex-
amined further in the text accompanying note 69 infra.
25. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: WHITE COLLAR CRIME, DRUG
OFFENSES, FORFEITURE & GENERAL PROVISIONS §§ 11.01-.05 (forthcoming 1998).
26. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (corporation may be
convicted for commission of an offense that was “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the cor-
poration within the scope of his office or employment”).  European standards for imputing criminal
liability to a corporation vary but, in general, are more narrowly cast than the federal principle in the
United States.  See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1490-91 (1996).  Recent English cases treat as matters of statutory construction
whether legislation criminalizing conduct should apply to a corporation, as well as whose act should for
this purpose count as the act of the corporation.  See Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v.
Securities Comm’n, [1995] 2 App. Cas. 500, 507 (P.C. 1995) (appeal taken from New Zealand).
27. Many federal circuits follow the rule stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909
(1958), which makes an award of punitive damages against a principal appropriate when the principal
authorized or ratified the agent’s act or when an agent in a managerial capacity acted within the scope
of employment.  See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 355 (1st Cir. 1988).  The origi-
nal federal rule was narrower, making the principal vicariously liable for punitive damages only when
the principal authorized or ratified the agent’s conduct.  See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,
147 U.S. 101, 114-16 (1893).
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pre-guidelines sanctions.28  Additionally, vicarious liability for criminal acts
seems to strain the assumptions that underlie agency.  In particular, in the ab-
sence of complicity at high levels, vicarious liability often taxes the corporation
and its shareholders with the consequences of conduct that the corporation it-
self has prohibited.  The misfeasant agents, that is, have contravened the in-
structions of their principal.  How, one might wonder, can such conduct be
within the scope of an agent’s authority; by establishing that it prohibited the
conduct, has the corporation not established that the agent’s motivation was
other than serving the corporation’s interests?  Moreover, lower-level employ-
ees and agents do not personify the corporation as its senior management
might in many respects be thought to do.29
The answer—or at least part of the answer—stems from the corporation’s
ability to define the incentive structure within which its agents act.  As an or-
ganization, the corporation defines rewards and penalties; by doing so it creates
incentives for agents to act in ways that promise rewards conferred by the or-
ganization.  These incentives can be so strong that they mute the message oth-
erwise conveyed by the organization’s instructions to its agents.
Consider two examples, neither entirely hypothetical.  A pizza business
markets its home delivery service as especially rapid, telling prospective cus-
tomers, “Delivery within 30 minutes of your order or the pizza is yours for
free.”  Delivery people are told “Never exceed the speed limit.  Never run red
lights.”  If they are also told “You pay for any free pizzas,” the drive-legally in-
struction competes with the agent’s financial self-interest, and some agents may
either determine to ignore the driving instructions or they may, less directly,
tend to over-estimate their skill to drive illegally but still inflict no injuries on
others.30  Indeed, this example does not presuppose that the management of the
                                                          
28. Compare Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm and
Sentencing Practices in the Federal Courts 1984-87, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605, 618 tbl. 6 (1989) (prior
to Sentencing Guidelines, median fine against corporate violators represented 13% of social harm
caused by violation and median total sanction represented 33% of social harm) with Mark A. Cohen,
Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practices in Federal Courts, 1988-90, 71
B.U. L. REV. 247, 260 tbl. 6, 276 (1991) (total sanctions for corporate violators now approach social
harm).
29. Lower-level agents and employees have circumscribed authority to act on behalf of the corpo-
ration, which limits the extent to which the corporation is bound to the consequences of their acts.  See
HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 124-26 (1972). Professor Pitkin’s analysis is
based on a distinction between the concepts of agency and representation.  See id.  An agent, in her
sense, is the “tool or instrument” through which the principal acts, while a representative is an em-
bodiment of the principal.  Id. at 125.  This distinction is not grounded in the law of agency, which sim-
ply recognizes degrees of authority among agents.  For example, in the terminology used by the Re-
statement (Second) of Agency, any employee is a “servant,” and “ship captains and managers of great
corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in the dignity and importance of their posi-
tions from those working under them.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220, cmt. a (1958).
30. Indeed, a defendant may be vicariously liable in tort for the negligent acts of third parties
when the defendant creates a foreseeable risk that such negligent conduct will occur.  See Weirum v.
RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975) (radio station liable for wrongful death of plaintiff’s
decedent negligently forced off highway by adolescent listener to station; station sponsored chase con-
test that rewarded first contestant to locate peripatetic disc jockey driving conspicuous red automo-
bile).
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pizza business intends for its agents to disregard the driving instructions.  The
example thus does not involve the phenomenon of instructions that the agent
reasonably understands the principal intends or means to be ignored.  The or-
ganization’s incentive structure has consequences for agents’ conduct separate
from management’s intentions.31
Separately, consider a business that compensates its employees exclusively
on the basis of the sales revenue they generate, paying them a percentage of
each sale amount.  If prospective customers for the product or service are likely
to be influenced by what the salesperson tells them, the employer’s instruction
to its sales force to tell nothing but the truth may compete with incentives that
the compensation structure creates to misstate material facts in order to en-
hance sales volume.  In its Caremark opinion, the court notes incidents in re-
cent business history, involving Salomon Inc., Kidder Peabody, and Prudential
Insurance, in which agents’ misrepresentations led to enormous financial and
reputational losses for their firms.32  In all three instances, the firms were mem-
bers of industries that reward employees on the basis of revenues generated in-
dividually through trading or selling, an incentive structure that with regularity
produces rogue agents who underestimate the risk that illegal conduct will be
detected and penalized.33
What the examples illustrate is that complying with the law may operate as
a binding constraint on the agent.  A constraint “binds” if it affects the agent’s
choice, and in the examples, complying with the law and the principal’s instruc-
                                                          
31. The real-life principal on which this example is based, Domino’s Pizza, dropped its 30 minute
guarantee after a jury awarded $79 million in punitive damages to a plaintiff injured by a Domino’s
delivery person.  See Jonathan Hadley Koenig, Punitive Damages “Overkill” After TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 751,
752 n.7 (1995).  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236, cmt. a, illus. 1-3 (1958) (torts com-
mitted by servants while driving may be within scope of employment even though servant had non-
work-related agenda when driving at work).
32. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
33. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Jerry W. Markham, Guarding the Kraal—On the
Trail of the Rogue Trader, 21 J. CORP. LAW 131 (1995).  Professor Markham notes that it is difficult to
formulate an overall compensation structure that both rewards traders who earn short-term trading
profits and rewards those who are concerned with the firm’s long-term safety.  Id. at 145.  For an illu-
minating discussion of the difficulties of effective supervision in such an environment, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics about
Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 648 (1996).  As it happens, Pruden-
tial Insurance and its agents, in the wake of the scandal mentioned in Caremark, fell into serious dis-
pute over the terms of Prudential’s contract with its unionized employee-agents.  See Leslie Scism,
Prudential Insurance, Agents Dispute Contract Over Higher Production Quotas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25,
1997, at A4.  Some agents argued that the company’s proposed contract, by tying eligibility for addi-
tional compensation to new sales, created incentives for agents to evade the company’s compliance
procedures and business standards.  See id.
Extensive literature in economics analyzes the role of incentives and other generic problems in
principal-agent relationships generally.  See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis
of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Optimal
Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 J. ECON. THEORY 231 (1979); Bengt Holstrom &
Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job De-
sign, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (special issue); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of
Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (May 1973); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing
and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
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tions to obey the law restrict the agent’s ability to accomplish the results that
are rewarded by the principal’s incentive and compensation systems.34  These
are situations in which the justification for imposing vicarious liability on the
principal is compelling and in which vicarious liability may appear even to be a
form of direct liability, given the reasonableness of expecting the principal to
take special care to monitor agents’ behavior in such situations.
Moreover, some agents who engage in criminal misconduct are not rogues
at all, but agents who act as a consequence of pressures created by the organi-
zation’s incentive and control systems.  The organization may formally instruct
the agent not to violate the law, but the agent may also understand that a fail-
ure to achieve specified results will lead to termination or to other sanctions.
The agent’s violation of the law can be seen as the consequence of either the
agent’s understanding that the principal intends that compliance with the law
should be sacrificed if necessary, or of ambiguity in the principal’s overall mes-
sage to the agent.35
A salutary consequence of vicarious liability is that it encourages organiza-
tional principals, like corporations, to strive for clarity in the messages con-
veyed to agents.  An agency relationship is in many respects a private system of
norms, in which the principal defines for the agent the acts of the agent that the
principal will treat as its own.  The principal communicates its wishes and direc-
tions to the agent, which the agent in turn interprets.  Third parties who inter-
act with the agent observe the relationship and the principal’s conduct, forming
inferences about the agent’s authority.  Agency’s intellectual distinctiveness
stems from its focus on relationships in which one person is a representative of
another and has a duty to account for the use made of the representative posi-
tion.  The legal definition of agency encompasses the principal’s right to control
the agent and the agent’s fiduciary duty toward the principal.36  Although
agency relationships result from voluntary association between the principal
and the agent, the legal consequences are distinct from the simple conse-
quences of contract because the principal has the right to direct the agent and
because the agent’s duties are those of a fiduciary.37
                                                          
34. This argument may help explain why nonprogressive commission structures are prevalent for
agents in some industries.  In the second example, the legality example would bind the agent even
more sharply if the percentage paid to the agent increased with the dollar amount of the transaction.
See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers,
Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503, 504-05 (1993) (noting that real estate
agents typically are paid a nonprogressive commission rate).
35. This point has long been evident to courts.  As the Ninth Circuit observed in 1972, in uphold-
ing a conviction for criminal violations of the Sherman Act:, such violations “are a likely consequence
of the pressure to maximize profits that is commonly imposed by corporate owners upon managing
agents, and, in turn, upon lesser employees,” making it probable that “generalized directions to obey
the Sherman Act, with the probable effect of foregoing profits, are the least likely to be taken seri-
ously.”  United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1000, 1006.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
37. The common law of agency treats the agent’s fiduciary status as a defining element of the rela-
tionship.  For a recent example, see In re Daisy Systems Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996)
(fiduciary relationship should be presumed to exist if trier of fact finds that investment bank acted as
agent of client).  See also Arthur D. Little Int’l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1189, 1207-08 (D.
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As a fiduciary whose role is to act on behalf of the principal, the agent may
not benefit through the relationship without the principal’s consent.  The
agent’s fiduciary posture supplies an interpretive benchmark for instructions
the agent receives from the principal, a benchmark that obliges the agent to in-
terpret instructions reasonably in light of the principal’s interests known to the
agent.38  The principal effects its control over the agent through language and
other forms of expressive conduct.  The agent’s duty as a fiduciary to interpret
the principal’s instructions reasonably in light of the principal’s interests is an
integral element of the principal’s right of control.  It assures the principal that
the agent may not evade control, or pursue self interest, through the interpre-
tive strategy of exploiting gaps or unclarities in the principal’s instructions.39
The principal’s right of control is a corollary of the agent’s role as a repre-
sentative of the principal.  As a consequence, the principal’s tasks in exercising
control are simplified because the principal need not develop and articulate
fully contingent statements of its instructions that spell out what the agent
should and should not do under all imaginable contingencies.  The fiduciary
character of the relationship means that the principal does not bear the risk
that its stated instructions contain gaps that the agent is free to exploit in a
fashion that is either self-interested or oriented to serving interests other than
those of the principal.
The legal consequences of agency also, of course, encompass the agent’s in-
teractions with third parties.  Doctrines of apparent agency and apparent
authority hold the principal directly accountable for the results of reasonable
third-party beliefs about the position or authority of the agent (or the apparent
agent) based on appearances for which the principal is fairly responsible, re-
                                                          
Mass. 1996) (if business consultant’s relationship with corporation constituted agency relationship,
consultant would have duty to disclose any conflict of interest and all facts it knew would reasonably
affect principal’s judgment whether to consent to dual agency).
38. Fiduciary doctrine tends to be more restrictive in the controls it imposes on the pursuit of self-
interest than is most contract doctrine, even that developed under the aegis of doctrines of good faith.
See Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 629-30
(1997).
39. To be sure, the law of agency enables the principal to consent to conduct on the agent’s part
that would otherwise amount to a breach of fiduciary duty by the agent.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958) (unless otherwise agreed, agent may not profit in connection with
transactions conducted on behalf of principal without giving such profit to principal); id. § 389 (unless
otherwise agreed, agent may not deal with principal as an adverse party in transaction connected to
agency without principal’s knowledge); id. § 393 (unless otherwise agreed, agent may not compete with
principal concerning subject matter of agency); id. § 395 (unless otherwise agreed, agent may not use
or communicate confidential information relayed by principal or acquired in connection with agency,
for his own benefit or for benefit of others in competition with principal).  But see id. § 390 (agent who
deals as adverse party with principal, to knowledge of principal, has duty to deal fairly).  The princi-
pal’s consent to self-dealing by the agent does not destroy the agent’s fiduciary status, as it bears on
the agent’s duty to interpret the principal’s instructions so as to best achieve the principal’s interests.
In contrast, in many contexts governed by principles applicable to arms-length contractual relation-
ships, courts protect parties who interpret contract language to serve their own interests.  Such protec-
tion is especially strong when the contract language is embedded in a debt security.  See, e.g., Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (issuer of debentures
free to interpret redemption language to benefit from post-issuance drop in interest rates, despite
showing that it had no expectation of early redemption when it issued debentures).
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gardless of the principal’s private understanding with the agent or apparent
agent, or restrictions that the principal has privately imposed on the agent.
Third parties who interact with the agent draw inferences about the extent or
nature of the agent’s authority to do particular acts; even when an agent acts
wrongfully toward a third party, the agent may reasonably appear to be acting
within the scope of authority granted by the principal, or with the principal’s
acquiescence, and may thus appear to represent the principal in the particular
interaction.  Agents who are apparently authorized to speak on the principal’s
behalf import the weight of the principal’s reputation into statements they
make on its behalf.
Agents’ misconduct—whether tortious or criminal—often stems from self-
interested motives.  If the principal is vicariously liable for its agents’ miscon-
duct, the principal bears the risk that agents will ignore the principal’s instruc-
tions in circumstances where compliance would jeopardize the agent’s success
within the organization’s incentive system.40  That is, vicarious liability ac-
knowledges the principal’s distinct role in defining its agents’ preferences.  In
contrast, contemporary critics of vicarious liability tend to omit the definitional
role that the principal plays in an agency relationship.  Professor Jennifer Ar-
len, a critic of vicarious liability, writes that
[c]orporate crimes are not committed by corporations; they are committed by agents
of the corporation.  These agents are rational self-interested utility maximizers who
commit crimes in order to benefit themselves.  In pursuit of his own self-interest an
agent may commit a crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but this is not its
purpose.41
This analysis embodies a misleadingly narrow view of the factors in play in
any principal-agent relationship.  While the principal’s benefit and the agent’s
self-interest are relevant, it is important not to ignore the principal’s right to
define incentives and otherwise control the agent’s conduct.42  In particular, the
principal defines the rewards and sanctions that shape the agent’s perception of
self-interest.43  Characterizations like Professor Arlen’s may also reflect an in-
                                                          
40. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 639, 653 (1996) (noting that thought processes of managers who commit securities fraud will be
affected by “organizational setting in which their actions are embedded”).
41. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 833, 834 (1994).
42. Characterizing the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” is not especially helpful when the
question is how to define the consequences of the agent’s misconduct.  See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan
O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323 (1996) (observing that “offenses that are la-
beled ‘corporate crimes’ inevitably involve harmful actions by some corporate actors without the
knowledge or consent of other contracting parties within the firm”).  By definition, some “contracting
parties” who do not have rights of control, such as the corporation’s creditors, neither know about nor
do they assent to corporate actors’ misconduct.  It is also an intriguing question whether the govern-
ment counts as a “contracting party” in this context.  As well, it is helpful to keep in mind that some
recent instances of criminal misconduct involved senior officers and directors.  See, e.g., Kurt Eichen-
wald, The Tale of the Secret Tapes, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 16, 1997, at 1 (detailing involvement of vice
chairman of Archer Daniels Midland Co. in criminal price-fixing conspiracy).
43. The principal occupies this definitional role even when the principal simply acquiesces in a
would-be agent’s proposed incentive scheme.  The law of agency, that is, presupposes that most princi-
pals, in accepting the terms of an offer made by a would-be agent, are capable of evaluating the risks
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tensely individualistic view of human nature that excludes external influences—
like those created by a principal—from the explanatory framework.
Vicarious liability also encourages an organization to use skill in selecting
agents.  By using care, the organization may avoid hiring would-be agents
whose incurable roguishness will be resistant to the organization’s control.  In
evaluating the effects of imposing vicarious liability, it is helpful to reflect on
the actual organizational traits of large business corporations, many of which
do not function according to classical models of formal bureaucracy.  Such
models postulate tight organizational control over individual actors, close at-
tention to articulating and following orders, extensive written documentation,
and depersonalized separation between specific individuals and the offices and
authority they hold.  In contrast, in many real-world business corporations,
authority is personalized to individuals, written documentation is disfavored,
and managers focus on personal survival in a fluid and perilous environment.
Credit in such organizations flows upward while detail and blame are pushed
downward, which tends to distance organizational superiors from bad news and
guilty knowledge contained deeper in the organization.44  Vicarious liability
creates incentives for the organization’s senior management to devise systems
and patterns of interaction with those lower in the hierarchy that will trump
these organizational traits.  All of these organizational traits, of course, reflect
the acts of human beings.  That such acts occur in an organizational context en-
hances the likelihood that they will influence the acts of other human beings.
Recognizing this possibility is not the same as anthropomorphizing an organiza-
tion, but it does explain why an organization’s traits could justify the ascription
of blame.45  An organization’s ability to define tasks narrowly, and to limit the
                                                          
the proposal would create for exercising control over the agent thereafter.  This presupposition does
not apply when the prospective principal and the prospective agent have a relationship of trust and
confidence, such that the prospective principal relies on the prospective agent to deal fairly.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390, cmt. e (1958).
This structure may lack descriptive bite in some situations, though.  Some agents—like CEOs of
many corporations—appear to personify the corporation, see supra text accompanying note 29, and
also to act without significant constraint imposed by the corporation’s board of directors.  For an ex-
treme example, see Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV.A. 13358, 1995 WL 54441 at *5, *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11,
1995), aff’d, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (employment agreement explicitly assured chairman and CEO
that directors would not “unreasonably interfere” with his work; CEO’s good faith determination of
“unreasonable interference” defined to be constructive termination, which entitled CEO to severance
benefits).  Likewise, agents who are professionals, like lawyers, may also act without significant client-
imposed constraint once they are retained.  To introduce a better fit between terminology and reality,
Professor Eric Orts has proposed characterizing some agents as “quasi-principals.”  Eric W. Orts,
Shirking and Sharking: An Economic and Legal Theory of the Firm 21 (Oct. 7, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).  Professor Orts does not propose to lessen the duties applicable to
quasi-principals, only to recognize the fact of their de facto authority and power.  In any event, a signal
trait of a “quasi-principal” may well be the practical ability to define the relevant incentive structure,
subject to the principal’s acquiescence.
44. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 20-21
(1988).  The federal Sentencing Guidelines appear to reinforce this tendency.  See infra text accompa-
nying notes 73-78.
45. In contrast, some scholars assume that moral condemnation is appropriate or intelligible only
when its object is a human being.  See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the
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knowledge possessed by individual actors, creates the capacity to elude criminal
sanctions that turn on the combination of a particular state of mind with par-
ticular acts.
Furthermore, vicarious liability works to strengthen the social meaning as-
sociated with criminalization.  The concept of social meaning encompasses “all
the ways in which the law creates and shapes information about the kinds of
behavior that members of the public hope for and value, as well as the kinds
they expect and fear.”46  At first it might seem counterintuitive to posit that vi-
carious liability has such an effect, because vicarious liability presupposes that
the principal’s own conduct—separate from that of its agents—would not con-
stitute, authorize, or ratify the criminal acts.  Vicarious liability acknowledges
that organizations—and principal-agent relationships more broadly—have the
capacity to define their own social meaning, distinct from that ascribed to con-
duct by broader institutions of civil society.47  A regime of vicarious liability
emphasizes to an organization’s senior management the importance of effec-
tively translating the social meanings defined by broader society into the or-
ganization’s own norms.
An additional sense of social meaning might reflect the fairness of ascribing
legal consequences to a particular person.  Professor Dan Kahan argues that it
is fair to “satisfy the public demand” for criminal punishment of corporate mis-
conduct, even supposing that compensatory damages are sufficient to redress
any injury, if the corporation has subordinated environmental protection to
profits.48  But surely fairness, as scholars of social meaning use the term, implies
limits.  Consider in this light the long-standing distinction drawn by federal law
between vicarious liability for employees’ criminal misconduct and vicarious
liability for punitive damages in civil litigation.49  In contrast to the broad prin-
ciple applicable to criminal misconduct, only high level complicity, or liability
stemming from the act of a managerial agent, warrants vicarious liability for
punitive damages.  The level of generalized social disapproval is less for con-
                                                          
Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 211 n.40 (1996) (“[L]egal fictions can neither feel nor deserve
moral condemnation; only people can.”).
46. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351
(1997).
47. A rich genre of first-person accounts of business behavior exemplifies this point.  The financial
services industry has generated memorable accounts written by authors no longer in the industry.
These accounts incorporate exposés into narratives that also feature coming-of-age and personal con-
fessional elements.  See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON
WALL STREET (1989); FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET
(1997).  Liar’s Poker is best known for its title incident, involving an offer of a $10 million dollar bet on
serial numbers on dollar bills between the CEO of Salomon, Inc. and one of its best bond traders.  See
LEWIS, supra, at 14-17.  In F.I.A.S.C.O., skeet shooting plays a large role in the author’s recounting of
his experiences in the derivatives department at Morgan Stanley.  See PARTNOY, supra, at 14, 99-108.
Within the department, selling a derivative to a customer, when the derivative was structured to be
more likely advantageous to the firm than to the client, was known as “ripping the client’s face off.” Id.
at 61.  Partnoy compares the firm to “a militia . . . . a savage cult.”  Id. at 91.
48. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 1998).
49. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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duct that has not been criminalized, and the social meaning of civil litigation—
even when directed at conduct generally viewed as odious—is less than that in-
voked by prosecution by the government.  Substantive standards for the impo-
sition of punitive damages tend to require a degree of malice or outrageous-
ness, or at least of willful misconduct, that may tend in many instances to
distance the defendant from the principal.50  In contrast, by requiring that the
agent have acted at least in part to benefit the corporation, the federal standard
for vicarious liability for criminal misconduct ties the agent to the corporation.
Vicarious liability thus reflects, in many ways, the principal’s right and pre-
sumed ability to define meaning within the context of an agency relationship.
The principal defines roles for agents and specifies the work that they are
authorized to do, thus defining for the agent the acts that the principal will treat
as its own.  The principal’s right to control the agent enables the principal to in-
struct the agent after the agent’s role has been defined.51  In the agent’s interac-
tions with third parties, agency doctrines like apparent authority hold the prin-
cipal to a reasonable interpretation of appearances that the principal has
permitted or facilitated.  The principal’s vicarious liability is not boundless,
however.  Limitations on the principal’s capacity to exercise control help ex-
plain the limits on vicarious liability.
C.  The Boundaries of Control
A brief return to the facts detailed in the Caremark opinion is instructive.
The court characterized the corporation as one with “a decentralized manage-
ment structure,” including 7,000 employees and ninety branch operations.52  Af-
ter the government began its investigation, Caremark took steps consistent with
greater centralization.53  It published a revised, centrally drafted guide and set
of contract forms for employee interaction with physicians and instituted a
                                                          
50. Professor Hart’s treatment is illuminating.  See Hart, supra note 2, at 56-59, reprinted in HART
ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 43-47.  Hart argued that when we ascribe legal consequences to a corporation,
we are not treating it as a fictitious person.  See id. at 57-59, reprinted in HART ESSAYS, supra note 2, at
44-47.  We are, instead, drawing an analogy to a living person.  See id. Courts must then assess the
force of the analogy: “Judges . . . in a case-law system, have to decide how far the analogies latent in
the law permit them to extend to corporations rules worked out for individuals when justice seems to
demand it.”  Id. at 57-59, reprinted in HART ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 47.  By implication, Hart’s ap-
proach does not limit the blameworthiness of conduct to natural persons, nor does it dictate any
sharply-drawn distinctions between vicarious liability for criminal misconduct and for civil judgments
and penalties.  Hart’s approach presupposes that an individual principal might justifiably be blamed for
the acts of the agent.  In other respects, the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings and con-
sequences is not stable.  See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Civil-Criminal Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782-84 (1997).  This lack of stability is not new.
Ancient legal systems featured extensive overlaps between crime and tort, such that distinctions be-
tween them were often unnecessary.  See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a
System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29, 56 (1996).
51. The right to give instructions on an interim basis is embedded in the legal definition of an
agency relationship.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (agent acts on behalf of
principal, who has the right to control the agent).
52. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 962 (Del. Ch. 1996).
53. See id.
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policy requiring regional office approval for each physician contract.54  As it
happens, employees evaded these control measures by having physicians exe-
cute the centrally furnished forms, which required physicians to perform speci-
fied services, all the while making it clear that payment from Caremark was in
exchange for patient referrals and that the specified work need not be done.55
Although Caremark’s decentralized structure may have made it more diffi-
cult to control employee conduct, this practical consideration does not reduce
the corporation’s accountability for its employees’ misdeeds.  Decentralized
management structures, in general, enable central management to set finan-
cially defined measures and goals for managers in operational units, and to de-
termine whether the measures and goals have been met, well apart from de-
tailed knowledge of operational matters.  Decentralized operation does not
redraw the corporation’s legally relevant boundaries.  In contrast, organizing
business activity through separately incorporated entities has the presumptive
effect of redrawing legal boundaries that specify the extent and scope of the
duty to exercise control.  Although the parent is accountable for its subsidiary’s
misdeeds if it authorizes and directs their commission, the subsidiary’s distinct
legal personality implies that the parent is not liable if it learns of wrongdoing
on the subsidiary level but fails to exercise control to remedy the wrongdoing.56
In this respect, the corporation’s formally defined legal personality delimits the
extent of its moral personality as well.  But the boundaries of legal personality
are not impermeable.
Suppose the parent corporation learns of subsidiary-level wrongdoing in
which the responsible actor is a director of the subsidiary.  If the parent af-
firmatively exercises its voting power to reelect the director, it has done more
than fail to correct the wrongdoing.  It has affirmatively acted in such a manner
that the wrongdoing is likely to continue or be repeated.  The parent has not
                                                          
54. See id. at 963.
55. See Thomas M. Burton, Fee for Service: Caremark Faces Heat for Paying Doctors Who Sent It
Patients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1994, at A1.
56. See In re American Honda Motor Co. Dealerships Relations Litig., 958 F. Supp. 1045, 1051-52
(D. Md. 1997).  In general, the parent risks liability for the subsidiary’s tortious misconduct only when
the parent has exercised intrusive operational control; the parent’s capacity for domination, created by
its stock ownership, does not suffice.  See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 6.02, at 114-15 (1987); see also id. § 10.02, at 187-91.  The parent’s
liability is more likely in product liability cases and in cases in which successor liability concepts are
applicable.  See JOSÉ ENGRÁCIA ANTUNES, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS 467-68 (1994).
Distinguished scholars find it curious that courts are so reluctant to hold a corporate parent liable
for its subsidiary’s obligations when the parent “possesses both the opportunity to control and the po-
tential to share in residual earnings” generated by the subsidiary.  See Robert B. Thompson, Unpack-
ing Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enter-
prise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).  Perhaps one explanation is that operations of a formally separate
subsidiary, into which the parent does not intrude, might not reasonably appear to represent the parent
or to import the parent’s reputation into the subsidiary-level activities.  The centrality of control to vi-
carious liability has been criticized in broader terms as reflecting factors that lack economic signifi-
cance.  See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1265 (1984).  The
critique does not assign independent significance to the fact that the parties chose to structure their
relationship in one manner rather than another, using generally available legal structures.
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explicitly ratified the wrongful acts themselves, but it has affirmatively enabled
the wrongdoer to retain the position in which the wrongful acts were commit-
ted.  Depending on how widely knowledge about the wrongdoing is shared
within the subsidiary, the parent may have communicated to those lower within
the hierarchy that it is less than indifferent to wrongful conduct.57
Questions about the boundaries of control are also relevant to the choice
between rules that impose vicarious liability and rules that embody a negli-
gence standard.  Agency law differentiates among degrees of control: If a prin-
cipal has the right to control the physical acts through which the agent carries
out the work, the principal is vicariously liable for physical harms caused by the
agent’s negligence within the scope of employment.58  In contrast, a more gen-
eralized right to control that does not encompass the specifics of the agent’s
execution of the work ordinarily does not make the principal vicariously liable
for the agent’s negligent physical acts.59  If an organization does not have the
right to control someone, like an independent contractor, the organization’s
duty is in most instances simply to use care in selecting the contractor.60  An
employer, however, has the right to control its employees’ conduct in their dis-
charge of work-related activity.  A negligence standard for employer liability
focuses energies on detecting and correcting employee misconduct but does not
penalize the employer for misconduct that it could not be expected to detect,
an expectation that weighs the costs of detection against the magnitude of the
employee’s wrong.  Vicarious liability, in contrast, focuses energies on preven-
tion, on systematic and proactive efforts rather than discrete reactions to spe-
cific known instances of misconduct.
A rule of vicarious liability obviates the need for courts to make difficult
fact-specific assessments of whether the employer acted reasonably, leaving it
to the employer to determine how best to control its employees’ conduct.  The
need to assess whether a principal acted reasonably—and whether its overall
message to its agents adequately conveyed directives to obey the law—places
the court in a stance of official skepticism toward organizations, skepticism of-
ten warranted by the failure of organizational mechanisms to select and control
agents.  Likewise, in situations where vicarious liability blurs into direct liabil-
ity—such as those in which the principal is subject to a nondelegable duty of
                                                          
57. For a discussion of problems of organizational credibility in deterring misconduct, see Jennifer
Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 712-17 (1997).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 243 (1958).
59. See id. § 250.  A principal is, however, subject to liability for an agent’s tortious misrepresenta-
tions that induce third-party reliance regardless of the principal’s degree of control over the agent.  See
id. § 257.  It is thus misleading to assert, as does one secondary authority, that a principal will not
“[n]ormally . . . incur liability” for the torts of an agent unless the agent is an employee over whose
physical actions the principal has a right of control.  HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 49, at 102 (2d ed. 1990).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1958).  Even though the prin-
cipal does not have a right of detailed control over the actor’s conduct, the principal is liable to a third
party injured by the actor when the principal owes the third party a nondelegable duty of protection or
care.  See id. § 214.
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care—the determination of how best to discharge that duty is left to the princi-
pal, not the court.61
The capacity to exercise control is also a determining factor in whether any
particular association of people should be treated as an organizational principal
for a wide range of legal purposes.62 If an association is so loosely structured
that individual actors are not subject to control, it is hard to identify individual
members’ acts with the association, and the risk of liability for the organization
may not be an effective deterrent to individual actors’ misconduct.
Imposing vicarious liability on an employer may be most effective in
achieving greater deterrence when the particular form of employee misconduct
is amenable to clear definition and prohibition.  The employer’s ability to send
a clear and unequivocal message depends on its ability to define the conduct to
be prohibited.  The respondeat superior principle, which makes the employer
vicariously liable for employee negligence within the scope of employment, re-
flects the employer’s right—and presumed ability—to direct the employee’s
physical execution of the work.  The employer defines the work and how it is to
be done.  The federal principle of vicarious liability for employees’ criminal
wrongdoing may likewise reflect the employer’s ability clearly to prohibit viola-
tions of the law.  Complex regulations, like those in Caremark, or legal prohibi-
tions that are themselves less than clear, test the employer’s ability to commu-
nicate a clear message and may well require more extensive reporting and
control systems to achieve compliance.63  For example, it might be necessary to
                                                          
61. See id.  When a principal owes a nondelegable duty of care, the principal is liable for injuries
caused by the actor’s failure to exercise care, regardless of the actor’s relationship to the principal.
Nondelegable duties usually arise as a result of the principal’s relationship to the plaintiff or as a result
of the inherently dangerous nature of the work.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383-84
(Alaska 1987) (hospital has nondelegable duty to plaintiff to ensure absence of negligence in provision
of emergency room services even when emergency room is staffed by independent contractors, not
hospital employees).
62. See, e.g., American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 593
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (observing that nonprofit membership association that set professional
standards had “no chain of delegated authority, from stockholders through directors and officers, in
the typical voluntary association . . . . [in which] members . . . exercise a far less structured control than
the stockholders and directors of a commercial enterprise”).
63. Internal difficulties in communicating a clear message help explain why it is likely that “highly
indeterminate legal standardssuch as those based on ‘reasonableness’ or ‘good faith’will have a
less direct impact on firm behavior than we would like to think.”  Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other
Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 169 (1997).
The same point can be made with regard to employer liability for sexual harassment.  Although
sexual harassment that violates Title VII is not a crime of the employer, the evolving federal law re-
flects comparable questions about the effective scope of employer control.  A majority of the Seventh
Circuit recently reasoned that an employer’s inability to convey a clear message regarding sexual har-
assment that creates a hostile working environment should warrant assessing the employer’s liability
under a negligence standard as opposed to a vicarious liability standard, even when the perpetrator
was the plaintiff’s supervisor.  See Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 493-94 (1997), cert. granted
sub nom Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876  (1998).  Agreement on this point is not uni-
form among the circuits.  When the supervisor occupies a high level in the organization, the Second
Circuit holds the employer liable for the supervisor’s creation of a hostile work environment if the su-
pervisor used actual or apparent authority to further the harassment, or the existence of the agency
relationship otherwise aided accomplishing the harassment.  See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634
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instruct employees to refer all instances that are even slightly open to doubt to
an organizational actor whose incentives are differently defined, like a lawyer.64
This route will be less effective to the extent the lawyer is captured by a prob-
lematic organizational culture.
Rationales supporting these examples of vicarious liability may overlap, but
they are not identical.  The respondeat superior principle is consistent with the
fact that much negligence is the product of lapses, not of intentional decisions
to act carelessly.  The principal’s vicarious liability reflects the principal’s abil-
ity to prevent many lapses by monitoring its agents65; monitoring often has the
function simply of reminding the agent to be attentive, much like the electronic
signals and messages emitted by many new cars.
In contrast, intentional wrongdoing, whether criminal or tortious, is not the
product of lapses.  Much intentional wrongdoing, of course, consists of agents’
own frolics and detours, acts entirely outside the scope of the agency relation-
ship.  On occasion, though, as the prior discussion argues, the agent’s inten-
tional wrongdoing is nurtured by the principal’s definition of incentives for the
agent.  The principal’s definition of incentives for its agents explains much of
the frequency with which agents, in an “excess of zeal,”66 overstep the bounds
imposed by the principal or by society more generally.  Other forms of inten-
tional misconduct may reflect agency relationships in which the principal has
acquiesced in agents’ misconduct, or might reasonably be perceived either to
have acquiesced or to have been less than diligent in discouraging it.  Vicarious
                                                          
(1997).  The Eleventh Circuit, however, requires a much tighter fit between supervisory authority and
harassment.  See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1537-39 (1997) (employer not liable when
supervisor creates hostile work environment but does not threaten employee with retaliatory acts
within supervisor’s authority), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997).  See generally David B. Oppen-
heimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Com-
mitted by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66 (1995).
64. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 63, at 158-59 (if definition of scienter attributed information in dis-
parate managers’ possession to firm, corporations wishing to avoid liability for securities fraud stem-
ming from systematic biases that shape internal communication of information would have incentive to
bring persons not subject to same biases into disclosure process).
Another possible limit is whether the agent’s misconduct has left tracks that are susceptible of de-
tection by the principal.  This limit would exclude attempted misconduct, like an offer of illegal remu-
neration under ARPL, if it did not require or trigger review within the organization.  The limit, termed
the “company act” doctrine, is suggested by Chief Judge Posner in a recent dissent to a Title VII case.
See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 494.  The “company act” doctrine does not appear to give much weight to a
principal’s ability to discourage or deter wrongdoing by its agents, emphasizing instead the presence or
absence of ability to detect wrongdoing once it has occurred.  If broadly applicable, the doctrine would
narrow the effect of well-entrenched agency doctrines like apparent authority.  Apparent authority
emphasizes whether the third party reasonably believed in an appearance that the agent had the right
to do a particular act, and whether the principal is accountable for that appearance, but not whether in
committing the specific act the agent has left tracks discernible to the principal.
65. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69
SO. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1760-61 (1996).  Professor Schwartz observes that liability rules may be more
effective in influencing conduct of institutional defendants “than in affecting the choices made by ordi-
nary-people plaintiffs.”  Id. at 1763.  An organization’s capacity to monitor its agents explains why it
may be more responsive to the risk of liability than are “ordinary-people defendants.”  See Steven P.
Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1705, 1737 (1996).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A, cmt. a (1958).
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liability underscores for the principal the need to convey a suitably sharp mes-
sage to agents.67
In many instances, vicarious liability for an agent’s intentional tort turns on
the relative closeness of connection between the wrongful act and an instru-
mentality used for wrongdoing that is also essential to the interests of the prin-
cipal’s own enterprise, as well as the risk of harm that the instrumentality itself
presents.  Although outcomes applying the common law of agency to inten-
tional torts vary noticeably among jurisdictions,68 the principal’s vicarious li-
ability for its agents’ fraud is fairly uniform and absolute, even when the agent
acted to serve only his own purposes, so long as the agent’s communications
with the victim reasonably appeared to be authorized.69  The agent’s ability to
communicate on behalf of the principal is essential for the agency relationship
to serve the principal’s interest.  The telephone in the hand of the broker, like
the gun in the holster of the police officer,70 is essential to the advantage the
principal anticipates through the agency relationship.71
An organization’s incentives to mount a proactive effort to deter criminal
wrongdoing are considerably buttressed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
                                                          
67. This point helps explain one of the apparent puzzles in agency law.  Many cases acknowledge
that “boys will be boys,” Oppenheimer, supra note 63, at 87, who bring into the workplace an inevita-
ble human propensity “for fun-making and emotional flareup” that may result in injury to third parties
as well as fellow employees, Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1946).  How, then, can one
sensibly conclude that “the employer controls the workplace”?  Oppenheimer, supra note 63, at 93.  At
least to some degree, the workplace seems inevitably and predictably always to be out of control.  The
answer is that the principal conveys messages to its employees and other agents about the types of be-
havior that are absolutely prohibited and those that are prohibited or not, depending—on the identity
of the perpetrator, the identity of the victim, the risk of public notoriety, and so forth.  The Supreme
Court has recently emphasized the importance of interpreting workplace behavior contextually, not
literally.  “The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surround-
ing circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation
of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).  The employer’s conduct is an integral element in the “constellation of surround-
ing circumstances” that employees perceive and that influences their conduct.
68. Compare Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying South Carolina
law) (employer’s liability for employee’s intentional physical tort limited to circumstances in which
employee’s motivation was at least in part to serve employer’s intents) with Mary M. v. City of Los
Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Cal. 1991) (employee may be found to have acted within scope of em-
ployment for respondeat superior purposes when employee’s misconduct represented a risk typical of
or broadly incidental to employer’s enterprise, even though the act was malicious in nature and did not
benefit employer).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958).
70. See West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1997) (dictum that employer would have re-
spondeat superior liability for tortious misconduct of police officer, even when officer acts on frolic of
his own not intending to further goals of employer, when misconduct is aided by appearance of intimi-
dating authority with which employer has invested officer).
71. It is unsurprising that courts differ in how they assess the closeness of the connection between
the agent’s wrong and the agent’s actually or apparently authorized responsibilities within an organiza-
tion.  In particular, cases diverge in applying the common law of vicarious liability to employers when
the employee has committed a sexual assault on a victim brought into physical proximity with the em-
ployee in a professional, advisory, or custodial setting.  For recent examples embracing relatively
broad standards for employer liability, see Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 346-47
(Alaska 1990), Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Cal. 1991), Samuels v. Southern
Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 573 (La. App. 1992), and Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry
and Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 309-11 (Minn. 1982).
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as they apply to organizations.  The Guidelines provide for a reduction in pen-
alties otherwise applicable, if the offense occurred “despite an effective pro-
gram to prevent and detect violations of law.”72  Penalties will also be reduced if
the organization reported the offense prior to an immediate threat of revela-
tion or of government investigation, or if it cooperated fully in the investiga-
tion.73  Under the Guidelines, whether an organization’s program is effective—
despite its failure to prevent or detect any particular offense—turns ultimately
on a number of situation-specific factors and, in general, on whether the or-
ganization exercised “due diligence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal
conduct by its employees and other agents . . . .”74  It is noteworthy that the
Guidelines create a rebuttable presumption that the organization’s program
was not effective if an individual “within substantial authority personnel” par-
ticipated in the offense.75  Such personnel “exercise a substantial measure of
discretion in acting on behalf of an organization.”76  In contrast, a program,
however effective it may generally be, will earn no reduction if “an individual
within high-level personnel of the organization” or of a unit with two hundred
or more employees, or an individual responsible for administering a legal com-
pliance program participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the of-
fense.77
The Guidelines, in short, deem a program to be ineffective if senior man-
agement (or the compliance officer) is complicit in the offense, and create a re-
buttable presumption of ineffectiveness based on the complicity of personnel
who are in positions that allow them to exercise significant discretion.  Manage-
rial complicity tends to suggest that the corporation’s formal documentation of
its compliance program would be belied by reality within the organization.78
Despite their emphasis on organizational compliance measures, the Guidelines
do not assign any specific role to a corporation’s directors, or to any organiza-
tion’s governing board.  The Caremark opinion thus fills a noticeable gap.
                                                          
72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f), at 305 (1997).
73. See id. § 8C2.5(g), at 396.  The incentive created by the Guidelines to report individual offend-
ers may strain relationships within the organization, especially within organizations that previously ig-
nored various employee misdeeds or limited sanctions to internal ones.  See Richard S. Gruner, To-
wards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law Through Federal
Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 407, 434 (1994).  These strains may be more severe because the
Guidelines create incentives to blame violations exclusively on low-level nonmanagerial employees.
See id.  In this respect, the Guidelines mirror the organizational tendency to pull credit upward while
pushing blame downward.  See supra text accompanying note 38.
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 app. note 3(k), at 381 (1997).
75. Id. § 8C2.5(f), at 395.
76. Id. § 8A1.2 app. note 3(c), at 380.
77. Id. § 8C2.5(f), at 395.  The Sentencing Commission, which drafted the Guidelines, considered
and rejected a proposal that a corporation should not be vicariously liable at all unless the offense im-
plicated its senior management.  See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and  Some Thoughts
About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 238 (1993).
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 229 (1991).
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III
DIRECTORS AS MONITORS
A.  Duty Articulated in Caremark
The doctrinal contribution of Caremark is to assign directors an explicit
function in the corporation’s control of its employees and other agents, with re-
gard to compliance with the law.  Directors have a duty “to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists . . . .”79  If a director breaches this duty, un-
der some circumstances the director may be liable for losses suffered by the
corporation.80  The duty articulated in Caremark runs counter to a broad read-
ing of the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1963 opinion in Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., in which the Supreme Court stated it knew of “no
rule of law which requires a corporate director to assume, with no justification
whatsoever, that all corporate employees are incipient law violators who, but
for a tight checkrein, will give free vent to their unlawful propensities.”81  The
court’s opinion in Caremark articulates three separate justifications for con-
cluding that Graham, read broadly, does not represent current Delaware law.82
First, the Delaware Supreme Court has since Graham stated in several opinions
“the seriousness with which the corporation law views the role of the corporate
board.”83  Second, the Delaware corporation statute imposes an ultimate super-
visory role on directors, which necessitates relevant and timely information.84
Third, the penalties imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines, along with the cor-
responding opportunities for penalty reduction, would be taken into account by
“[a]ny rational person attempting in good faith to meet an organizational gov-
ernance responsibility . . . .”85  The Caremark opinion additionally, however,
explicitly states a high threshold for directors’ liability: “Only a sustained or
                                                          
79. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).  As it happens,
the duty stated in Caremark is comparable to the duty articulated by Professor William L. Cary in his
1974 critique of Delaware corporate law.  See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 80 YALE L.J. 663, 684 (1974).  I owe this reference to Ed Labaton.
80. A limiting circumstance is whether the director’s breach constituted a proximate cause of the
loss.  See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 n.27.  The proximate cause concept as applied to directors’
breaches of duty has occasioned controversy.  In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371
(Del. 1993), the supreme court, reversing the court of chancery, held that for purposes of rebutting the
presumption created by the business judgment rule that directors acted with due care, it was not neces-
sary for the plaintiff to establish that an injury resulted from the directors’ failure to act with due care.
See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *17 (Del. Ch. June 24,
1991).
81. 188 A.2d 125, 130-31.
82. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
83. Id.  The court refers specifically to Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  Another illustration is
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[W]e are satisfied that in the
broad context of corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of
directors is not a passive instrumentality.”).
84. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (referring to DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991)).
85. Id.
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systematic failure . . . to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”86  In the Court’s
view, a lower threshold might disserve shareholders as a class by reducing the
likelihood that qualified people will agree to serve as directors.87  This consid-
eration is presumably not applicable to the corporation’s officers, or to officers
who also serve as directors; nothing in the court’s opinion addresses either the
duties to monitor assumed by officers or the liability threshold applicable to of-
ficers.88
Caremark’s practical significance is likely to turn on the meaning of good
faith in this context.  Although the court’s elaborate opinion uses the term
“good faith” frequently, sometimes italicizing the words for emphasis, the
opinion does not define the concept.89  The factual context in Caremark itself
meant that the court lacked concrete occasion to consider the content of direc-
tors’ duties when the board becomes aware that the corporation’s control struc-
ture has not worked.  During the government investigations, Caremark had an
internal audit plan and employed Price Waterhouse as an outside auditor.90
                                                          
86. Id. at 971.
87. See id.
88. As it happens, federal criminal law supports the imposition of vicarious liability on managerial
employees who had “a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction,” even employees who
attempted to prevent the violation.  United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670 (1975) (quoting United
States v. Dotterwiech, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943)).  Park is discussed in Coffee, supra note 78, at 213-15.
89. The court uses “good faith” at one point as a term opposed to “rationality.” Caremark, 698
A.2d at 967.  In articulating its formulation of the business judgment rule applicable to decisions made
by directors themselves, the Caremark opinion states that the rule forbids judicial assessment of the
substantive merits of the directors’ decision if it resulted from a process that was “either rational or
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”  Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).  One
might interpret this sentence to protect subjectively well-intentioned decisions by directors that are
made in an idiosyncratic, inexplicable, or illogical manner.  The full import of this interpretation is un-
derscored by the duty to exercise judgment in an informed manner.  See id. at 970; see also Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
In any event, the scope of this aspect of the business judgment rule as articulated in Caremark ap-
pears at odds with cases in which courts do review the merits of directors’ decisions, even when the di-
rectors appear to have acted without a conflicting self-interest.  For a recent example, see Brane v.
Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (directors of grain cooperative breached duty of care by
failing to hedge long positions in grain).  See also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (in re-
jecting recommendation of litigation committee that derivative suit be dismissed, court observes that
business judgment rule would not protect a “no-win” decision by directors that exposed the corpora-
tion to substantially augmented risk without an increased measure of potential gain).  The astute
reader will note that neither of these cases comes from Delaware.  Delaware cases do, though, recog-
nize that nonconflicted (i.e.,”disinterested and independent”) directors might be liable for a decision
“so egregious on its face” that the test of business judgment cannot be met.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 815 (1984).
For a recent (and rare) case finding that circumstances alleged in the pleadings met this standard,
see Rothenberg v. Santa Fe Pacific Corp., Civ.A. No. 11749, 1995 WL 523599 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 1995)
(directors offered favorably revised terms under an exchange offer for debentures to debenture hold-
ers who had already bound themselves by tendering in response to an earlier and less generous offer;
sole contemporaneous explanation offered by directors was “fairness to our investors”).  To be sure,
one could try to accommodate the business judgment rule as stated in Caremark to these cases by
treating them as instances in which directors were insufficiently informed.  That treatment strains the
actual analysis in Joy v. North and Rothenberg, which has an unmistakably substantive focus.
90. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963.
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The board’s Ethics Committee received and reviewed a report from Price Wa-
terhouse concluding that Caremark’s control structures had no material weak-
nesses.91  Additionally, management reported the introduction of other compli-
ance measures to the board, including the dissemination of a new ethics manual
and the introduction of an ethics hotline.92  In contrast, if directors learn of
flaws in the control system, or of misconduct that has occurred despite a well-
designed system, what constitutes a good faith response from directors?93  Is it
consistent with good faith for directors to rely on management’s assurances
that the problem will be fixed without inquiring about the details?  Does good
faith require directors to demand that known violators be sanctioned?
Even if directors are unaware of specific failures in the control system’s op-
eration, Caremark leaves open questions about the content of directors’ duties,
questions going in particular to whether directors have a duty to look behind
the corporation’s formal control and compliance systems.  Have the directors
acted in good faith if, assured that an effective system is in place, they rely en-
tirely on management to implement it?  Must directors insist on periodic re-
porting about experience under the system to the board as a whole, or to a
committee of the board?  It is interesting in this light that the settlement of the
shareholders’ derivative suit, approved by the court in Caremark, mandated du-
ties to be performed by the board’s Ethics Committee on an ongoing basis.94  In
any event, many questions remain open.  Their significance is underlined by the
fact that determinations of good faith carry substantial collateral consequences
for directors.  If directors have not acted in good faith, an exculpatory provision
in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation will not shield them from li-
ability,95 and the corporation may not indemnify directors against expenses they
incur in the unsuccessful defense of litigation when the directors’ underlying
conduct was not in good faith.96
                                                          
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Indeed, if a director learns that a federal felony has been committed, the director commits the
separate federal crime of misprison of felony if the director “conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the [commission of felony] to some judge or other person in civil or military authority
under the United States . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).  Mere failure to report or make the underlying fel-
ony known does not constitute concealment for purposes of misprising the underlying felony, which
requires an affirmative step.  See U.S. v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989).  Thanks to
Roger Goot for calling this possibility to my attention.
94. See id. at 972; see also In re Metropolitan Life Derivative Litig., 935 F. Supp. 286, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (settlement of derivative litigation required action of independent Sales Practices
Compliance  Committee of board of directors “with duties and powers related to sales practices com-
pliance”; corporation’s internal Ethics and Compliance Department to be required to communicate
directly with board committee).
95. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996).
96. See id. § 145(a), (b).  These subsections define the corporation’s power to indemnify.  The sub-
sections have been held to limit the corporation’s ability to expand rights to indemnify through bylaw
or contractual provisions.  See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir.
1996).  In particular, the corporation lacks power to obligate itself to indemnify when the would-be in-
demnitee’s conduct was not in good faith.  By statute, though, the corporation may purchase director
and officer liability insurance as to circumstances in which it would lack power to indemnify.  See DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1996).  Although D&O policies appear not to contain a specific ex-
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Questions of good faith aside, whether a system is adequate should reflect
an assessment by directors of the risks created by the corporation’s own incen-
tive system.  As argued above,97 the corporation may define an incentive system
for its employees that supersedes the practical effect of instructions the corpo-
ration gives its employees.  Additionally, the corporation’s incentive system
may tempt some agile-minded employees to attempt to outwit any compliance
system.  By statute directors are charged with ultimate managerial responsibil-
ity within the corporation,98 a charge that should encompass reflection on both
the risks of wrongful conduct that the corporation’s own incentives and struc-
tures enhance, and on the adequacy of the corporation’s mechanisms for con-
trolling such risks.  Along the same lines, ultimate managerial responsibility
should encompass reflection on the challenges to control, as created by decen-
tralized operation.
Substantive questions like these often surface with a procedurally colored
tinge created by the structure of shareholder derivative litigation.  In particular,
in Delaware directors enjoy by virtue of the business judgment rule a presump-
tion that in making a business decision they acted in good faith, on an informed
basis, and with an honest belief that the action taken was in the corporation’s
best interests.99  When, as in Caremark, the plaintiff’s claim is that the corpora-
tion suffered loss due to its directors’ failure to monitor, the plaintiff would
have the burden of showing that the directors lacked good faith “as evidenced
by sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise reasonable oversight . . . .”100
In Delaware, the shareholder’s derivative action would be dismissed if the
plaintiff has failed to make a prior demand on the board that it take action,
unless the plaintiff makes factually specific allegations that suggest a substantial
likelihood that the directors are liable.101  Nor is the plaintiff entitled to take
discovery to enrich the factual particularity of the complaint to surmount the
demand hurdle.
                                                          
clusion for claims arising from conduct not in good faith, policy coverage that reimburses the corpora-
tion for indemnification payments is limited to payments that are required or permitted by applicable
law.  See also supra note 15.
97. See supra text following note 20.
98. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).  Caremark explicitly encompasses directors
within the corporation’s control structure; as an employer, or principal, the corporation is a gatekeeper
that supports its employees’ activities.  See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 55-56 n.6 (1986) (noting that control over
employees’ incentives is a powerful device to deter misconduct).
99. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
100. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
101. See In re Baxter Int’l Shareholders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1269-70 (Del. Ch. 1995).  If the plain-
tiff instead alleges that events associated with the misconduct injured the shareholders individually,
other challenges await the nonderivative—that is, the direct—action.  For example, if directors have
not been candid in their disclosures to shareholders, damages are available “only in circumstances
where disclosure violations are concomitant with deprivation to stockholders’ economic interests or
impairment of their voting rights.”  Loudon v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 147 (Del.
1997).
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B.  Reforming the Business Judgment Rule
This combination of circumstances is likely to strip the directors’ duty to
monitor of much practical significance, at least as an affirmative matter.  Valu-
able though the business judgment rule is in many respects, in this context its
presumptions create a hurdle that would only rarely be surmounted.  None-
theless, it is important to note the significance the duty to monitor may assume
in the advice lawyers give their corporate clients.  In an advisory context, the
court’s articulation of an affirmative duty to monitor lends substantial weight to
counsel’s recommendation to directors during the decisionmaking process.102
Some directors, though, may well ask what their actual risk of personal liability
may be, an inquiry that makes salient the affirmative import of Caremark.  To
be sure, barriers to a successful derivative suit are not absolute.  The plaintiff
may pursue avenues other than discovery to obtain information and thus by-
pass the demand requirement.  When the claim is that directors have failed to
monitor, these routes may hold less promise than in other contexts.103  The
shareholder’s statutory right to inspect corporate books and records is not
likely to be of much assistance, for it is unlikely to yield information relevant to
the directors’ good faith in relation to monitoring.104  Nor are reports filed with
the SEC, often informative as to directors’ self-dealing, likely to be useful.
Even if the plaintiff somehow surmounts the demand hurdle, the plaintiff will
still bear the burden of demonstrating the directors’ lack of good faith.
Consider, however, an insight one might glean from the Federal Sentencing
                                                          
102. Professor Rock argues that many Delaware opinions are written with this broader advisory
audience in mind.  See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1095-96 (1997).  Indeed, in advising their clients, lawyers may sys-
tematically tend to overstate legal risk.  See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing
the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
Professors Langevoort and Rasmussen analyze the lawyer-client relationship as a quintessential agent-
principal relationship in which overstating risk tends to serve the self-interest of the agent (the lawyer)
to the detriment of the principal (the client).  A moderately more charitable explanation for overstat-
ing risk is that the lawyer fears the client will ignore a more nuanced or modulated message, albeit one
that more accurately assesses the legal risk.  See id. at 415 (discussing “sharpening” a message to cap-
ture the client’s attention).  In particular, the lawyer may believe that the client (in organizational re-
ality the human agent who interacts with the lawyer) will hear only what the client wants to hear, ig-
noring the qualifications or the bad news about limits and restrictions that accompany the good news
about legal flexibility and permissiveness.  Evidentiary doctrines reflect judicial awareness of the fact
that clients may misremember, or only partially remember, what their lawyer told them.  See, e.g.,
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985) (court declines to find that advice purportedly
given by lawyer was in fact given when defendant directors did not call as witness lawyer who gave ad-
vice at board meeting regarding proposed merger; court notes lawyer’s firm participated in defense of
shareholder lawsuit).
103. If, for example, a shareholder suspects the existence of a self-dealing transaction between the
corporation and a director or controlling shareholder and seeks to challenge it, the corporation’s ac-
counting records will be helpful, as will be any report filed with the SEC pursuant to Regulation S-K,
item 403, detailing the terms of the transaction.  See generally 17 C.F.R. 229.403 (1998).  Financial
journalism may be a useful source of information as well.
104. The use of statutory inspection rights in this context is urged by Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d
927, 934-35 n.10 (Del. 1993).  See also Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection
Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69 (1997); Randall S. Tho-
mas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring and Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to
Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331 (1996).
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Guidelines as they apply to organizations.  The Guidelines deem an organiza-
tion’s compliance program to have been ineffective when the wrongdoing im-
plicates a senior executive.105  The Guidelines create a rebuttable presumption
of ineffectiveness when a lower-level person with significant discretionary
authority is complicit in the wrongdoing.106  The Guidelines implicitly recognize
that the effectiveness of compliance programs turns heavily on the discretion-
ary decisions of managers, in particular decisions about whether to acquiesce in
others’ wrongdoing, and, short of that point, whether and how vigorously to in-
vestigate circumstances that appear problematic but may have an innocuous
explanation.  More broadly, senior management has the opportunity to define
for the organization the meaning that will be ascribed to particular conduct.
Corrupted by its own participation, management is not likely to be vigilant in
detecting and addressing the wrongdoing of others.  Nor is complicit senior
management likely to be candid in its relationship with noncomplicit directors.
With moderate reworking, the business judgment rule would apply better to
the duty to monitor that Caremark articulates for directors.  If the plaintiff al-
leges facts demonstrating a sufficient likelihood of senior management’s com-
plicity in criminal wrongdoing, the presumption that directors acted in good
faith should be inapplicable.107  Instead, the directors should have the burden of
establishing their good faith, and the plaintiff should be excused from making a
demand on the board.108  In the suit, directors might well be able to establish
that they acted in good faith.  But a presumption of good faith is inappropriate
when senior management is complicit in criminal wrongdoing.  Presumptions as
a general matter usually reflect the difficulties of proving that a probable event
in fact occurred.109  If senior management is not complicit in the wrongdoing, it
is probable that the corporation’s directors acted in good faith, most likely re-
                                                          
105. See supra text accompanying note 77.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
107. If members of senior management have been indicted, the plaintiff by alleging that fact in the
complaint would demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of complicity for this purpose.
108. Recent Delaware authority couples the demand requirement to the “powerful presumptions of
the business judgment rule . . . .”  See Rales, 634 A.2d at 933.
Unlike Delaware, some jurisdictions require a prospective plaintiff to make a demand on the board
prior to filing suit in all or virtually all instances.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1984).
Once the plaintiff makes the demand, the board may appoint a committee of directors to conduct an
inquiry; if the committee “has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon
which its conclusions are based” that maintaining the derivative suit is not in the corporation’s best
interests, the court must dismiss the suit.  Id. § 7.44(a).  If a majority of the board consists of independ-
ent directors at the time of the court’s determination, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
committee failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry in good faith.  See id. § 7.44(d).  A director does not
lack independence for this purpose solely because the derivative suit names the director as a defen-
dant.  See id. § 7.44(c)(2).  In this formulation, the concept of good faith does substantial work.  The
official comment defines “good faith” subjectively, to mean “honestly,” quoting Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982) (inquiry goes to “‘the spirit and sincerity with
which the investigation was conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or basis for
conclusion”).
109. See 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 580 (4th ed. 1992).  For
example, official actions by public officers are presumed to have been regularly and legally performed.
See id. at 581.
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lying heavily on senior management to transmit the appropriate message
downward into the organization and to assure the efficacy of internal systems
to detect and address wrongdoing.  That directors acted in good faith is less
probable when senior management is complicit in the wrongdoing.  Directors
are more likely to have been cavalier about compliance, or to have deferred to
senior management’s autocratic assertion of an entitlement to unquestioning
deference, or have retained senior management once danger signals appeared.
While the failure to ask questions and require satisfactory answers falls short of
ratification of the underlying misconduct, it exemplifies conduct that may well
not be in good faith.110
Allocating the burden to establish good faith to directors in these circum-
stances also emphasizes the inappropriateness of relying on the mere fact of the
corporation’s formal compliance system, or deferring to autocratic senior man-
agement, when directors themselves know that all is not well on the legal com-
pliance front.111  A powerful analogy may be drawn to directors’ affirmative du-
ties of vigilance and inquiry in fulfilling periodic disclosure obligations created
by the federal securities laws.  Directors who learn of serious misconduct by
senior management—such as concealing a fraudulent self-dealing transaction—
have a duty to take immediate action that effectively protects the interests of
the corporation’s investors.112  Moreover, even in the absence of such specific
knowledge of failure to disclose, a director who signs a disclosure document
may rely on the company’s procedures for determining the information that
must be disclosed only when the director has a reasonable basis to believe “that
those procedures have resulted in full consideration of those issues.”113  If the
disclosure in question concerns a dominant senior executive or the executive’s
close associates, greater attentiveness by other directors to the disclosure of
those individuals is advisable.114
IV
CONCLUSION
The intellectual underpinnings of agency, along with its doctrinal conse-
quences, are unifying elements among many otherwise disparate bodies of law.
The principal’s position within an agency relationship enables it to define a pri-
vate system of meaning for the agent and for third parties who interact with the
                                                          
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 91 (1958) (to ratify agent’s unauthorized conduct
principal must know material facts).
111. Directors’ general right to rely on the advice and recommendations of officers, employees,
committees, and persons external to the corporation is a right of good faith reliance, not absolute reli-
ance.  See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c) (1984)
(reliance not in good faith when director has knowledge that makes the reliance unwarranted).
112. See In re Cooper Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 35,082 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,472, at 86,065 (Dec. 12, 1994).
113. In re W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release Nos. 39,156 & 39,157, [1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,963, at 89,897 (Sept. 30, 1997).
114. See id.
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agent, a system that ascribes meaning to the agent’s acts and to the principal’s
statements and other expressive conduct toward the agent and third parties.
Agents who commit crimes in connection with the roles that their principal has
defined for them may do so because the principal’s incentive system has struc-
tured the agent’s perception of self-interest to a degree that it supersedes the
force of any instructions from the principal to obey the law.  The incentive sys-
tem, that is, transforms the principal’s communication overall into a message
that might be very different from the message the principal intended to convey.
The same phenomenon explains many instances of the intentional tort of fraud
committed by agents.  The principal’s ability to define its agents’ incentive
structures, and otherwise exercise control over agents, is a principal justifica-
tion for imposing vicarious liability on a principal for its agents’ wrongful acts,
and a justification with unifying force among the varying circumstances that are
relevant to the imposition of vicarious liability in particular circumstances.
This justification, however, is subject to a number of limiting principles, among
them the fact that the principal’s right and capacity to exercise control are
bounded, not limitless.
Agency provides a useful framework within which to view corporate gov-
ernance.  The underlying question raised by Caremark is whether—or the de-
gree to which—directors should be treated as integral to the corporation as a
principal in its relationships with employees and other agents.  By assigning di-
rectors an explicit function in the corporation’s exercise of its duty as a princi-
pal to control its employees and other agents, the Caremark opinion fills an
otherwise embarrassing gap in the legal doctrine of corporate governance.115
Directors who monitor in good faith should consider the likely impact of the
corporation’s incentive system on its agents’ conduct.  The efficacy of the duty
articulated in Caremark is however, vulnerable to the rigidities of the business
judgment rule as it shapes derivative litigation.  The pitfall of a duty to monitor
that is largely aspirational is that the duty is likely to be taken seriously by di-
rectors who are suitably receptive to advice about their duties, but less likely to
be taken seriously by directors who are not so inclined.
The principal’s vicarious liability for the agent’s misconduct is also com-
patible with viewing agency as a system of normative and linguistic meaning de-
fined by the principal.  Viewed in this light, the principal’s vicarious liability for
the agent’s misconduct reflects the principal’s right to control the agent, as well
as, in many circumstances, the fact of economic integration between the agent’s
activity and the principal’s interests.  Vicarious liability compels the principal to
accept responsibility for the agent’s conduct.  The principal is accountable for
the agent’s misconduct if it has not defined meaning for the agent with suffi-
cient clarity, and the agent as a consequence misunderstands (or understands
all too well) the overall import of the principal’s instructions.
                                                          
115.See also Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01 cmt.
to § 4.01(a)(1)-(a)(2) cmt. c, at 164-68 (1994) (articulating principle that directors have an af-
firmative duty to monitor compliance with law).
